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Many government entities throughout the world are developing mechanisms to 
help renewable energy become better integrated and more competitive with 
nonrenewable energy. Typically, renewable energy is more expensive and riskier than 
conventional energy generation, thus creating an emphasis on the need for cost 
reduction of renewable energy, as well as understanding how contractual agreements 
affect buyers and sellers of energy. In the United States, government mandates have 
been developed in the form of State-specific Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that 
require specific percentages of renewable energy consumption to be met, along with 
the procurement methods to be used that ensure the renewable energy percentages will 
be met. The usage of RPS and renewable energy requirements have increased the need 
for long-term energy agreements. 
The two most common forms for managing the purchase of renewable energy 




(RECs). Both RECs and PPAs typically use a Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) 
calculation to determine the price of energy and they may contain limitations on how 
much energy can be purchased. Conventional LCOE calculations are limited, as most 
analyses assume constant cash flows, and do not account for variable annual energy 
generation from renewable energy or contractual terms that limit the purchase of 
energy. This can lead to significant errors, because the conventional LCOE calculation 
may be lower than the actual LCOE, since it does not consider the energy purchase 
limitations created by PPAs and RECs that lead to additional costs when energy 
generation falls above and below the energy purchase limitations. The conventional 
LCOE calculation also does not consider the effect on financing a project when 
penalties associated with the under or over production of energy are not symmetric. It 
is critical to have an LCOE that accurately reflects the actual situation for an energy 
project or the project may be in danger of failing as the costs to run the project are not 
being covered from the revenue received from selling energy. It is also important for 
utilities to obtain accurate LCOEs because utilities may be reluctant to use renewable 
energy if the calculated LCOE is higher than the actual LCOE.  
This thesis develops a new model for LCOE that accounts for the energy 
purchase limitations used in PPAs for wind farms.  The thesis also provides a real case 
study from the Maryland Offshore Renewable Energy Credits (ORECs). The case study 
demonstrates that the LCOE is higher when including the production loss from years 
where energy is higher than the awarded OREC quantity. The case study also 
demonstrates the potential to award more ORECs at a lower cost, because the Total 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The Cost of Energy (COE) becomes a major concern for the public and utilities 
as the demand for power from renewable energy sources, such as wind, increases. 
Utilities may become reluctant to purchase more renewable energy than they are 
required to purchase if the COE is too high. COE or the contractual price for energy is 
usually calculated from the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE). The COE is the actual 
cost to buy energy while the LCOE is the break-even cost to generate the energy. A 
level of profit or buffer against unpredicted costs may be included into the COE on top 
of the LCOE.  
LCOE is a commonly accepted calculation of the Total Life-Cycle Cost (TLCC) 
for each unit of energy produced in the lifetime of a project [1]. Many people have 
worked to improve the computation of the TLCC to ensure that every potential cost is 
accounted for so that an energy system can be protected against financial failure [2] - 
[7]. However, conventional calculations of LCOE do not account for contractual 
obligations from Outcome-Based Contracts such as Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs) and certain types of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) that allocate risk to the 
generator through the usage of energy purchase limits, where the costs from the energy 
purchase limits are referred to as penalties. It is critical to ensure that all potential costs, 
such as those that arise from energy purchase limits, are accounted for in the LCOE in 




renewable energy as interested parties are looking to see if there is success in existing 
projects. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) 
The levelized cost of energy, also known the levelized cost of electricity, or the 
levelized energy cost, is an economic assessment of the average total cost to build and 
operate a power-generating system over its lifetime divided by the total power 
generated of the system over that lifetime [1]. 
The definition of LCOE is the cost that, if assigned to every unit of energy 
produced by the system over the analysis period, will equal the Total Life-Cycle Cost 









where discrete compounding is assumed, Ei is the amount of energy produced in year 
i, r is the WACC (or discount rate), and n is the number of years over which the LCOE 
is calculated.  
The TLCC is the sum of the initial investment (I), and the present value of the 
total O&M costs (PVOM) given by [1], 
 









where OM is the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) cost in year i.  The LCOE assigns 
a value for every unit of energy produced during the given lifetime of a project. 
Traditionally, PPAs treat the contract length as the whole lifetime of the project, 
making short-term PPAs more expensive than long-term PPAs [8] - [11]. 
Since LCOE is, by definition, a constant, it can be factored out of the summation 
in Equation (1) and is given as, 
 









Although the denominator of Equation (4) appears to be discounting the energy (and is 
sometimes refer to as the “discounted energy”, e.g., [12]), the discounting is actually a 
result of the algebra carried through from Equation (1), in which revenues were 
discounted (energy is not discounted, only cost can be discounted). 
 Based on the derivation of LCOE, the LCOE model must incorporate all 
financial parameters that contribute to the TLCC. This thesis presents a model that 
includes PPA penalties in the TLCC. 
1.2.2 Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
In 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was passed to 
promote “alternative” generation sources and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. During 
this period, most utilities were both the generators and sellers of energy [13]. PURPA 
served to create the market for PPAs as utilities were required to purchase energy from 
non-utility facilities and those facilities were outside of the transmission and 




primary mechanism for integrating generator-only facilities into the electricity market 
as utilities were required to enter long-term energy contracts. Initially, the PPA price 
was based on the avoided cost of the utility [11]. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) was concerned that the contractual price was based on a future 
estimate of avoided costs and the actual avoided cost at a specific moment in time could 
fall above or below the contract price. In the end, FERC decided that a single 
contractual price still managed to balance the risk of varying avoided costs for both the 
energy generator and the utility. The avoided cost model looks at the avoided costs at 
a specific time during the project, but the FERC determined that it would be impractical 
to measure the costs in short intervals to determine prices throughout the contract and 
the contract price should be determined based on the duration of the PPA [11]. 
PPAs are Performance-Based Contracts (PBCs) that aim to create a “fair” and 
risk-controlled agreement for the purchase and sale of energy between a utility (the 
Buyer) and a generator (the Seller). They do so by allocating risks in energy generation 
and delivery through mechanisms such as energy purchase limits, defining the point in 
transmission when energy officially transfers ownership, and prescribing the frequency 
of O&M [14]. Energy purchase limits serve to reduce risk to the Buyer. A maximum 
energy purchase limit is used by the Buyer that may not want to buy as much of 
renewable energy than what may be required by the State because it may be more 
expensive than conventional energy sources. A minimum energy purchase limit may 
be used by the Buyer to ensure that enough energy is being sold to them to ensure that 
consumer demand is being met and to keep the Buyer out of the spot-market, which 




allow for more stability in prices between utilities and energy generators. PPAs also 
ensure that the Seller is selling energy at value that can recuperate the cost of producing 
energy when the spot-market may be selling energy at lower prices than the cost to 
generate. 
 
Figure 1: Spot-market prices for 3rd week of 2016 in Germany [15]  
The use of PPAs has been increasing around the world and are common in 
Europe, the U.S., and in Latin America. In Germany alone, wind projects with PPAs 
totaled over 1.2 GW in capacity in 2013 [16]. In a data published by Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory with a total of 34,558 MW of capacity in 387 signed or planned 
PPAs for 2016-2017 [17].  Between 2008 and 2016, 650 MW of new capacity was 
signed in the U.S. and in 2015 the use of PPAs in the U.S. grew to 1.6 GW [18]. In 
Latin America, governments typically award PPAs instead of private corporations or 
utilities. In 2014, the government of Peru awarded PPAs to projects with a total of 232 




Within the U.S., PPAs have gained more prominence as State governments set 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). RPS laws mandate the level of renewable 
energy that a State is expected to consume. Utilities must then purchase renewable 
energy at the levels required by the RPS [20].  Because renewable energy is currently 
more expensive than gas or coal (in the U.S.), utilities utilize a maximum energy 
purchase limit so they do not have to purchase more of the expensive renewable energy 
than required. In other parts of the world, minimum energy purchase limits may be 
preferred over maximums due to a government’s energy policies, as is the case in some 
Latin American countries. Government policies shape the preferences for using a 
minimum, maximum, minimum and maximum, or no energy purchase limitation in 
PPAs. Even within a region of the world, such as Europe or Latin America, differences 
in energy or environmental policies amongst countries mean energy purchase limitation 
preferences vary.  
In the electricity market, another type of Outcome-Based Contract is utilized 
between utilities and consumers called Performance Based Rates (PBRs). A PBR is 
designed to reward utilities for good performance and penalize for poor performance 
[21]. The penalty in PBRs is based on the under-delivery of electricity to the customer 
based on number of interruptions and the duration of those interruptions. Similar to the 
penalty, the utility may receive a bonus from consistently providing uninterrupted 
electricity to the consumer. There is a maximum level allowed for both the penalty and 
the bonus. In between the beginning of the bonus level and the beginning of the penalty 
level is a “dead zone” where performance is not measured and the penalty and bonus 




the x-axis represents theoretical levels of performance. This contract is similar to a 
PPA, but in this case the utility is the Seller and not the Buyer.  
 
Figure 2: PBR penalty and bonus structure [21] 
1.3 Existing Work 
1.3.1 LCOE Modeling 
Several LCOE models currently exist and are used to determine prices for wind 
[2] - [7]. NREL uses SAM (System Advisor Model) to compute the LCOE using wind 
farm data for PPAs as shown in Equation (4) [5], 
 












where CPEi is the cost to produce energy in year i and each parameter is given in the 
ith year. In the SAM model, the LCOE is calculated based on expected cash flows for 




actual money spent and costs involved in a wind farm project, SAM does not recognize 
the implementation of penalties in its wind LCOE model [5]. The SAM model 
calculates a PPA price within its financial model that includes tax credits, but the PPA 
price is only a discounted value from the calculated LCOE and does not capture the 
impact of penalties. 
Similar to SAM, the most commonly used LCOE models do not include tax 
credits, production losses, or penalties. Some LCOE models, such as the one shown 
developed in [7], 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  
∑










which explicitly include the following costs: fuel cost (F), production tax credit (PTC), 
depreciation (D), tax levy (T), and royalties (R)1.   Equation (5) includes fuel cost and 
royalties that are not relevant (equal to zero) for wind, however, we include them here 
for generality. Equation (5) recognizes that the tax credits reduce the total cost, but it 
does not recognize PPA penalties as a cost. Other models have also been used, such as 
[2], 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  
𝐶𝑅𝐹
𝐸
(𝐼 + 𝑂𝑀) (6) 
                                                 
1 Note, the sum in the numerator of Equation (5) starts at 0 (versus the sums in Equations (1)-(3) and the 
denominators of Equations (4) and (5), which start at 1).  This difference is a result of the treatment and 
interpretation of the investment cost.  Equation (7) assumes that the investment cost is all charged at the 
end of year 0 (beginning of year 1), while Equations (1)-(3) assume that the initial investment is allocated 
using a depreciation factor over the entire time period of the project. However, some projects will 
depreciate investment costs over the length of their first energy contract and some over the recovery 
period of the investment. In the model developed in this thesis, investment is depreciated over the entire 




where CRF is the capital recovery factor.  The model in Equation (6) considers the 
LCOE as a direct project cost and not the sum of the TLCC of wind farms, which should 
include tax credits and PPA penalty costs in the TLCC. 
 LCOE has also been used to compare systems and optimize system design 
strategies. In a photovoltaic (PV) system, LCOE is used to compare the efficiencies of 
different units [22]. PV modules that produce at higher efficiencies will have lower 
LCOEs than similar modules producing at lower efficiencies [22]. LCOE allows for 
the systems to compare the life-time cost for PV modules and whether the cost is 
worthwhile based on the expected efficiency of the module. In another case, LCOE can 
be used an objective function when optimizing the design of a system. In aiming to 
minimize the LCOE of a wind turbine, costs per part of the turbine have been evaluated 
compared to the industry’s average on a 5 MW turbine to produce an LCOE lower than 
the LCOE produced using the industry’s average 5 MW turbine [23]. Although some 
of the parts of the turbine are optimally a higher price than the industry’s average, the 
performance is more optimal on the system at a higher cost and may reduce the LCOE 
of the system. LCOE has even been used to compare the cost of entire grid systems 
with various options on different levels energy sources that could be used to meet 
consumer demand [24]. 
Besides LCOE, the Levelized Avoided Cost of Energy (LACE) is another 
commonly used metric to calculate the COE.  LACE is the difference between the cost 
of electricity on the grid and the cost of electricity generated by the project [25]. 




without concern on the effect of the local market (assuming that the energy generator 
is not engaging in the spot-market).  
1.3.2 PPA Analysis 
While PPAs are not a new concept, there has been relatively little modeling and 
analysis published on PPAs. The various components that should be included in a 
PPA, including descriptions of PPA pricing and PPAs price escalations have appeared, 
e.g., [26]. There are also descriptions of how RECs can be incorporated into PPAs and 
the usage of PPAs to meet State RPS mandates [26]. In [26] a description of what is 
used in a PPA and development of the link between RECs and PPAs is provided.  In 
addition, many papers view PPAs as simple agreements for the purchase of energy 
based on a specific price and include discussions on the purchase and sale of energy, 
length of the agreement, commissioning process, curtailment agreements, 
transmission, milestones and defaults, credit, insurance, and environmental attributes 
and/or credits [14] [26] [27]. These are useful for understanding how PPAs work, but 
do not address how the PPAs should be priced.  
Linking PPA elements to LCOE has also been addressed in the literature. Miller 
et al. [28], looks at the increase in LCOE and PPA price as OM increases and as losses 
to the system increase. This work includes a review on how an increase in the CF can 
decrease the LCOE [28]. The effects described in [28], are only qualitatively addressed 
and do not account for contractual conditions that produce additional costs. The work 
in [28] demonstrates the link between using LCOE and PPA and then demonstrates 




the SAM model in the way it connects LCOE to the PPA price, but it demonstrates 
more of the sensitivity to cost variables whereas SAM will just produce a PPA price 
that is discounted from the LCOE [5].    
Beyond considering just PPAs, a study has looked at the optimal bidding of 
wind power into the day-ahead market [14]. In this study, it is assumed that not all 
wind farms want to sell into their PPAs and would like to consider entering the spot-
market. The purpose of the study is to determine the optimal quantity and price based 
on a penalty between the spot-market price and the price that was bid into the day-
ahead market by the wind energy producer [14]. The results of the study are based on 
maximized profit where the optimal amount of energy to bid into the market depends 
on the expected day-ahead price, but the profit is not reflected in the price of energy 
in a PPA or meeting and energy purchase limit [14]. The decision to divert energy 
from the PPA into the market is purely based on the expected day-ahead prices and 
the actual PPA price. 
Most papers that include the terms “PPAs” and “LCOE” are creating a simple 
link where LCOE is used to calculate the PPA price (e.g., [28] [29] [30]). There are 
the basic connections to LCOE such as reductions to capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
and operational and maintenance expenditures (OPEX) reducing the LCOE and PPA 
price (e.g., [28] [31] [30]). Some authors make the distinction between PPA price and 
LCOE. LCOE is an estimated cost or it may be a cost that reflects the actual break-
even cost at a point in time while the PPA price reflects the actual agreed-upon price 
[32] [33]. Although a lot of research has been done on how CAPEX, OPEX¸ discount 




analysis done connecting contractual conditions, such as energy purchase limits, to the 
LCOE. 
1.3.3 Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) 
RECs are mechanisms used by utilities to meet RPS requirements and are used 
by governments to ensure that RPS requirements are being met. The purposes of 
RECs, which is to help renewable energy become integrated into the energy market in 
accordance with RPS requirements, are reviewed in [34]. RECs also allow for a lower 
cost method for utilities to meet RPS requirements by allowing the utilities to choose 
between directly purchasing renewable energy or to obtain the REC associated with 
the output of renewable energy. There are also reduced costs in transmission as 
renewable energy does not have to be transmitted long distances, i.e., it can be claimed 
as used in a location from ownership of the credit [34]. The study in [34] takes an 
economist approach to determining REC prices by looking at the supply of renewable 
energy versus the demand for it based on RPS requirements. The model considers the 
cost of energy to be linear to generation, which this thesis later shows is not the case. 
The model makes the simple assumption that renewable energy can be produced at a 
constant rate and if more energy is produced the cost will increase at the same constant 
rate [34].  
RECs also provide flexibility for the energy market by allowing entities to claim 
the renewable energy without worrying about locational and physical bottlenecks [35]. 
Beyond locational and physical benefits for meeting RPS requirements, RECs also 




after they have met RPS requirements. The market for RECs has even further benefits 
in providing an easier method for tracking renewable energy. Without RECs, it would 
be difficult to distinguish renewable energy from nonrenewable energy. Without 
RECs, a separate transmission would have to be built just to track renewable energy, 
which is not practical. In [35], an outline is provided to demonstrate the difference 
between unbundled and bundled RECs, where unbundled RECs represent the 
environmental attributes of renewable energy and bundled allow for the unbundled to 
be traded while also holding the REC to account for the renewable energy that actually 
flowed through the utility. Overall, the benefits from RECs are extensive and they 
allow for technical, market, and political flexibility [35].  
1.3.4 Non-PPA Outcome-Based Analysis with Contract Penalties 
Outcome-Based Contracts have also been referred to as: Performance 
Contracting, Availability Contracting, Contract for Availability, Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition, Performance-Based Contracts, and Value-Based Contracts [36]. 
Pharmaceuticals are an example of an industry that is leaning towards outcome-based 
contracts. In these contracts, like PPAs, payments are contingent upon achievement of 
goals, objectives, or performance benchmarks [37]. Unlike PPAs, in the pharmaceutical 
industry value-based contracts have performance benchmarks based on how well the 
drugs provided will achieve their intended use [37]. The penalty in this case is that there 
will be no payment for drugs that did not work as intended, essentially this penalty will 
function like a maximum purchase limit where the limit is modified to reflect a 




allow for higher prices to account for the drugs that may not work and for drugs of 
higher quality [37]. These contracts have become popular in the health industry as new 
laws have been passed to manage patients’ health through the cost and quality of the 
care provided to them [38]. It is suggested that the penalties for not meeting 
performance outcomes outlines in the contract incentivize better market outcomes 
through improving output [39].  
In Europe, countries such as Sweden and Denmark have opted to use 
Performance-Based Contacts on public transportation systems [40]. In these contracts, 
there is a penalty for delivery under the minimum service level (minimum delivery 
limit), but there are also incentives within the contract to perform above the minimum 
service level. These incentives include subsidizing some of the cost per person per trip 
above the minimum service level and to pay for the vehicle hours above the minimum 
service level [40]. Although the pricing of the contract may not reflect the incentives 
to perform above the minimum service level, the contract recognizes the commercial 
benefit of running public transportation more often. 
Another example in Outcome-Based Contracting is Roll Royce’s Power-by-
the-Hour Performance Based Contract. In this type of contract, the contract price is 
based on provided availability in hours [41]. This is a similar contract model to PPAs 
as the contract is attempting to guarantee a specific minimum quantitative level of 
performance that functions like a minim purchase limit, but it is not the same since it 
aims to meet hours of performance while PPAs aim to provide a quantity of the product. 
More details on the difference between Availability and Performance contracts to PPAs 




for wind farms under Outcome-Based Contracts [42]. In the context of PBCs, a lot of 
research has been done on optimizing the O&M side of servicing the contract to ensure 
that the specified level of availability can be achieved [42] -  [44]. The works mentioned 
have the goal to meet a level of availability to deliver to the customer already defined 
in the contract by the customer while this thesis focuses on the cost impact and penalty 
of not meeting the specified level of delivery.  
1.3.5 Gaps in the Current Cost Models 
LCOE is a simplified model used to reflect a system that is running in steady 
state. The terms within LCOE models allow for each cost contribution to vary annually, 
but typically the calculation is used with constant annual costs and constant energy 
production. The most significant problem with LCOE models is that they implicitly 
assume that years of overproduction of energy cancel out the years of underproduction 
of energy, which allows for the usage of an average energy generation in LCOE. This 
is an assumption that cash flows and the penalties are symmetric with respect to energy 
production. Discounting on cash flow and variability in energy generation, which 
makes energy flow unevenly around energy purchase limits, creates asymmetry in cash 
flows that invalidate the treatment of LCOE with a steady-state, i.e., infinite horizon, 
model.2  This problem makes conventional LCOE models invalid for use in defining 
PPA-based pricing and ratepayer impacts. 
                                                 
2 Infinite horizon models assume that over an infinite time period, stochastic processes will become 
stationary and there will be a convergence to a steady state. This process assumes that initial conditions 




Under very specific conditions, LCOE could be used as an infinite horizon 
model. One of these conditions is a discount rate that is very small or zero. To be treated 
as an infinite horizon model PPAs must also allow for very specifically structured 
conditions for the roll-over or roll-under of energy generation to meet or not exceed 
energy purchase limits, i.e., the provision to push under or over production into future 
years. This would not be an issue if energy production did not fall significantly over or 
under the PPA imposed energy limits, meaning that there is little variability in energy 
production.  
It is important to note that for real applications, LCOE is an asymmetric 
problem, because the penalty for exceeding the energy purchase limit is not equivalent 
to the penalty for producing under the energy purchase limit (i.e., the two do not cancel 
each other out). In general, the LCOE model does not account for the actual cost of 
these penalties. The model needs to be improved to account for certain conditions that 
arise from energy purchase limitations in State RPS, RECs, and PPAs. 
1.4 Thesis Objective 
An accurate LCOE is critical to ensuring the financial success of an energy 
project as it is used to calculate the price of energy and determine what the future 
revenue will look like to offset the costs of the project. However, the contractual 
conditions used to regulate risk in energy projects may create unforeseen costs not 
accounted for in conventional LCOE models. Energy purchase limitations, a 
mechanism used to reduce the risk in uncertain energy production to the Buyer, is a 




energy purchase limits produce penalties, which with uncertain cash flows, create 
asymmetric cash flows. An argument can be made that the penalties imposed by the 
PPAs for over production and underproduction should average out over the lifetime of 
the project, discounting (especially with high discount rates for wind farm projects) 
does not allow for this to happen3. This is not a problem unique to the private sector, 
the public sector also engages in PPAs and distributes RECs that function like PPAs 
with energy purchase limitations, specifically the Maryland ORECs (see Chapter 3).  
The objective of this thesis is to develop a modified LCOE model that accounts 
for variation in energy production. The model must be applicable to real wind farms 
and show that the LCOE can vary significantly based on energy generation variation. 
Two verification tests are provided in this thesis that demonstrate how different wind 
farms are affected by energy purchase limits and variable energy generation. This thesis 
also applies the modified LCOE to a case study on the Maryland ORECs, which have 
already been awarded to two wind farms, but the price does not reflect the LCOE with 
a maximum energy purchase limit. As there are three possibilities to what can happen 
with the Maryland ORECs, the modified LCOE model is applied for each wind farm 
and a combined price for both wind farms for each of the three possibilities. Policy 
implications and suggestions are provided at the end from the results of the study. 
                                                 
3 In PPAs, energy is purchased as it is delivered and the account for the purchase of energy is rectified 
at the end of the year. If energy is under-delivered, money will be taken out of the account to pay the 
penalty to the Buyer. If energy is over-delivered, then money will be taken out for the energy that should 
not have been purchased or purchased at a lower price. This develops part of the need for a cost model 
that considers the penalties because the project is assumed to be correctly financing energy as it is bought, 




1.5 Research Tasks 
• Task 1: Modify the LCOE model to account for energy purchase limits. The 
model must account for the production loss and various options for 
overproduction of energy for a PPA with a maximum energy purchase limit, as 
well as the penalty cost that arises from a PPA with a minimum energy purchase 
limit. 
• Task 2: Very the modified LCOE model. 
o Task 2.1: Test the LCOE model using a controlled wind farm case study 
where capacity factor (CF) is varied along with energy purchase limits 
for three different PPAs: (1) one with a minimum energy purchase limit, 
(2) one with a maximum energy purchase limit and no sell option for 
excess energy, and (3) one with an option to sell excess energy into the 
spot market. 
o Task 2.2: Apply the modified LCOE model to real wind farms with real 
CF data. 
• Task 3: Apply the modified LCOE model to a case study of the Maryland 
Offshore Renewable Energy Credits (ORECs). 
o Task 3.1: Reverse engineer the calculations for the OREC price and 
ratepayer impact from LAI models4 
                                                 
4 Levitan Associates Inc., (LAI) is a consultant that was hired by the Maryland Public Service 
Commission (PSC) that was tasked with reviewing and financially modeling the applications submitted 
for the Maryland ORECs. The two applicants for the Maryland ORECs were Skipjack, an offshore wind 
developer with a lease off the coast of Delaware, and US Wind, an offshore wind developer with a lease 




o Task 3.2: Use LAI’s assumed cost variables along with the modified 
LCOE to calculate new OREC prices. 
o Task 3.3: Perform sensitivity analysis on the cost variables in the 
modified LCOE model. 
o Task 3.4: Determine ratepayer impact. 





Chapter 2: Modified LCOE Model 
2.1 Formulation of the New LCOE Model 
Existing LCOE models do not consider all the cost parameters in a wind farm 
managed via a PPA. There are limits to the delivery and purchase of energy within 
PPAs that may be referred to as energy purchase limits or energy delivery limits. PPAs 
may define a maximum annual energy delivery quantity, a minimum annual energy 
delivery quantity, both of these limits, or neither. The energy delivery limits are cost 
parameters that are typically not considered, but should be considered, in a 
conventional LCOE model. The terms generally follow the rule that after the maximum 
energy delivery is reached, energy will no longer be purchased by the Buyer, the energy 
will be sold at a reduced price, or it will be sold on the spot-market [45]. This is 
generally considered a cost/penalty for the Seller, since they lose some or all of the 
value of the energy that is produced after the maximum delivery quantity is reached. 
Similarly, there is a direct cost/penalty in the minimum energy delivery defined in the 
PPA, as every unit of under-produced energy must be paid back at the agreed upon 
COE. The PacifiCorp draft PPA is an example PPA with a minimum energy delivery 






Figure 3: Application of Penalties for a Wind Farm Under a PPA 
In Figure 3, the maximum and minimum energy limits demonstrate how the 
penalties are applied. As shown in the figure, each year that the energy production is 
above or below the limits, a penalty is applied. The new LCOE model reflects the costs 
of energy production that is above the maximum and/or below the minimum energy 
delivery limits. The model begins with an existing LCOE model, Equation (5), and 
alters it to include the delivery penalties and all applicable tax credits (TCs).  The cost 
for under-delivering energy (PN), is the difference between the energy that was 
generated and delivered (E) and the threshold for the minimum penalty (Minlim) based 






where Ei is the sum of all the energy produced in the wind farm from N turbines in year 
i, CFi,j is the average capacity factor in year i for turbine j, and RPj is the rated power 
of turbine j. Using this calculation for energy, the production loss and the penalty from 






(𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝐸𝑖)𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖          when 𝐸𝑖 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝
0                                                    when 𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝
 (8) 
In Equation (8), Minlim is smallest fraction of expected energy production (Pexp) 
that the Buyer requires. The purpose of the minimum limit is for the benefit of the 
Buyer. The Buyer expects a minimum amount of energy to meet the demands of its 
consumers. If the energy does not meet the requirement, then the Buyer has to go to an 
outside source (e.g., the spot-market) and may have to purchase energy at a higher 
price, which the Buyer will require the Seller to compensate them for.  Similarly, the 
production loss (PL) is the difference between the energy that was generated (E) in that 
year and the threshold for the maximum penalty (Maxlim) based on the Pexp, 
 
𝑃𝐿𝑖 = {
(𝐸𝑖 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝)𝐶𝑂𝐸(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚)   when 𝐸𝑖 > 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝
0                                                                           when 𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝
 (9) 
In Equation (9), Maxlim is the largest fraction of expected energy production that 
the Buyer is willing to purchase. PPAterm is a fraction that represents the type of penalty 
placed on the Seller after the maximum energy limit has been reached. In a PPA with 
no outside sell option the PPAterm has a value of 0. When all the energy is purchased by 
the Buyer regardless of the limit the PPAterm is 1 and therefore PL is never applied.
5 PN 
is only applied during the years that actual energy production is less than the quantity 
of energy determined by MinlimPexp, i.e., when Ei<MinlimPexp. PL is only applied when 
                                                 
5 Maximum limits are used for various purposes and do not apply to every PPA case. Certain states in 
the United States, e.g., Maryland, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania have renewable energy standards [20]. 
These standards force utilities to obtain a specific fraction of their energy from renewable energy. At the 
present time in the United States, renewable energy is more expensive than energy from non-renewable 
sources. Therefore, utilities will only buy up to the required fraction and will create maximum limits so 




the energy produced exceeds the amount of energy determined by MaxlimPexp, i.e., when 
Ei>MaxlimPexp.  
The LCOE model including the unaccounted-for cost variables that exist in 
PPAs is given by6, 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  
∑










where PL and PN are only included in the total penalty cost (Pen) when their calculated cost 
in a year is greater than $0. Generally, the variable I can be fall within the term CAPEX and 
OM, F, and TC can all be categorized as variables that fall within the term OPEX.  In Equation 
(10) the sums in the numerator and denominator start at i = 0 under the assumption that the 
investment cost (Ii) comes from a depreciation schedule (see footnote 1).  In the case where the 
PPA allows for the Buyer to sell into the spot-market, the PL may have a negative value. The 
Peni in year i is the sum of the production loss and the penalty cost, 
 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑁𝑖 + 𝑃𝐿𝑖 (11) 
and the tax credit in year i (TCi) is given by,  
 𝑇𝐶𝑖 =  𝐼𝐵𝐼𝑖 +  𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑖 +  𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖 + 𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖 +  𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑖 +  𝐷𝑖 (12) 
where all types of tax credits that can be applied to a wind farm are included (see 
nomenclature for specific tax credit contributions). Both Pen and TC depend on the 
conditions imposed by the PPA. 
                                                 
6 This thesis does not focus on modeling the myriad of individual cost contributions to the LCOE.  More 
complex models with more parameters that attempt to account for all the costs in an energy project exist, 
e.g., [3] [4]. In contrast, this thesis uses a simple LCOE model and focuses on the effect of penalties from 





 Figure 4 demonstrates the recursive process of calculating LCOE. It considers 
all costs that go into CAPEX and OPEX. It also takes the actual annual energy 
production, the total value of TCs, and the Pexp used to determine the energy purchase 
limits. With all these variables, the COE of the project can be determined, and the COE 
can then be used to calculate the total penalty cost depending on the particular energy 
purchase limit the PPA has. The Pen is then included in the LCOE equation and if 
LCOE is equivalent to the COE, the process stops, and the energy purchase price is 
determined. If not, the COE must be adjusted accordingly, and a new Pen is determined 
until COE is the same as LCOE. 
 




2.2 Model Verification 
A controlled study of wind farms was conducted to explore the effects of CF 
variation and energy delivery requirements on the LCOE7. LCOEs were calculated 
based on three types of PPAs for wind farms with an annual CF that varies around an 
average CF of 0.4, as shown in Figure 5. This study uses a CF of 0.4 as a best-case 
scenario based on projections as most wind farms operate on a capacity factor of 0.25 
to 0.4 [47]. Wind speed varies significantly from location to location. Although wind 
turbine technology has been working to improve the capacity factor, some locations 
may still have a poor wind source and the capacity factor can fall significantly below 
0.4. The LCOE and CF are both strongly dependent on wind source and the location of 
the wind farm. Under favorable wind conditions, the LCOE of an onshore wind farm 
can vary from 0.05 USD/kWh to 0.06 USD/kWh and under unfavorable wind 
conditions it can vary from 0.07 USD/kWh to 0.12 USD kWh [48]. The change in CF 
considered in this model verification exercise was determined by increasing and 
decreasing the average CF by the same fraction per year in the same wind farm. In 
Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 the fractions in CF change ranged from 0 to 0.4, where 
at the CF of 0 is the best-case for a wind farm and 0.4 is the worst-case [47] [49] [50].  
                                                 
7 This thesis does not explicitly consider pre-construction risks and how they impact the LCOE. This 
study focuses on the impact of the variation in energy production due to uncertainty in wind speed. 





Figure 5: CF variation used in model verification tests with an average CF of 0.4 
The three types of PPAs considered in the model verification are: (1) one with 
just a minimum penalty, (2) one with just a maximum penalty where no energy can be 
bought above the limit, and (3) one with just a maximum penalty where the energy 
above the maximum energy delivery limit has to be sold into the spot-market at spot-
market prices or can be bought at a fraction of the COE. The penalty from the maximum 
energy delivery limit, either reflected by selling energy at a fraction of the value or 
selling energy onto the spot market, determines the value for the PPAterm as a fraction 
of the COE (which is demonstrated in the design for the maximum penalty in a Pakistan 
PPA [51]). Although the average CF = 0.4 is the same in all the cases considered in 
this section, the COE for each wind farm is different since the LCOE differs for each 
wind farm due to the variations in the CF. The costs and energy produced in each year 




that the CF varies. Each LCOE in this section was calculated for a duration of 5 years. 
The following data was used to calculate the LCOE, 
I = $1500 per installed kW [52] 
OM = $0.01 per kWh produced [52] 
F = $0 
TC = $0.05 per kWh sold [53] 
r = 0.089 per year [54] 
RP = 3000 kW 
COE = LCOE from Equation (12) with Peni  = 0 and using Equation (7) for Ei 
The investment (I), although shown as a single value, is a value that is depreciated over 
the lifetime, or in many cases the length of the PPA, of the wind farm and changes for 
every year i. The COE in a PPA is generally calculated from an LCOE that does not 
consider delivery penalties as a cost. For this reason, the cost calculated from penalties 
in the new model uses the calculated LCOE (for an individual wind farm) under a PPA 
without penalties as the COE. Pexp is calculated as the average annual expected energy 
production from a specific farm8. In these cases, the expected energy production is 
calculated using a CF of 0.4 for every year (Danish wind farms averaged 0.41 in 2012 
[55] and it has been predicted that between 2005 and 2030, wind farms will be operating 
at capacity factors between 0.36 and 0.43 [50]). Ei is calculated using a CF that is based 
                                                 
8 However, the COE should be adjusted as shown in Section 2.1 and Figure 4. For the sake of simplicity, 
the model verification calculates the COE before penalties are included and uses that first calculation 




on the variability around the average CF. The values of Minlim, Maxlim, and Ei, are then 
used to calculated penalties. 
 CF variation in the following series of tests was generated as the fraction of 
energy that is produced in year i that falls above or below the average CF of a project. 
Figure 5 demonstrates this with two farms that have an average CF of 0.4 over 5 years. 
Wind farm 1 in this case has a CF variation of 0.05, this means that 0.05 more energy 
is produced in one year and 0.05 less is produced in another. Wind farm 2 in Figure 5 
is similar as it assumes a CF variation of 0.15. The algorithm used in this study valued 
year 2 as the higher than “expected” CF year and year 4 as the lower than “expected” 
CF year. A different pattern of uncertainty than Figure 5 would yield different results.  
We only use the pattern in Figure 5 as a simple example for model verification purposes 
(in the case study in the next section of this thesis we have used actual CFs for actual 
wind farms).  
Figure 6 shows the results for a PPA with only a minimum energy delivery 
limit. In this case, as the variation in the CF increases, more energy is likely to fall 
below the annual minimum requirement, thus increasing the LCOE. The greater the 
variation, the more likely the LCOE will be affected by the minimum energy delivery 
limits. The domain for Minlim is [0,1], because the required minimum annual delivery 
quantity could range from no required quantity, Minlim = 0, to a requirement for the 
entire expected output of the wind farm, Minlim = 1. The increase in values for the 
different variations in Figure 6 are ramps where the LCOE increases between values of 
Minlim and then increases at a slower rate thereafter. Before the value of Minlim where 




there is no energy produced below Minlim.  When there is no variation in the CF (the 
“None” case in Figure 6), the LCOE is independent of Minlim. 
 
Figure 6: Offshore PPA with just a minimum energy delivery limit with different 
variation in energy around the average CF = 0.4 
 The value of Maxlim can range from 0 to greater than 1. Maxlim = 0 implies that 
every unit of energy produced is penalized, and Maxlim = 1 implies that every unit of 
energy over Pexp (the annual expected energy production) is penalized and every unit 
of energy below Pexp is not penalized.  However, a PPA will generally not create a 
Maxlim much lower than 0.5. The Maxlim may also exceed 1 because of variation in 
energy generation. If a wind farm generates above the expected energy production 
every few years, a Maxlim greater than 1 gives the wind farm room to avoid being 
penalized for producing more than Pexp.  
Figure 7 shows a PPA where once the energy goes above the maximum energy 
delivery limit, that excess energy can be sold into the spot-market. A normal 




per MWh and a standard deviation of $38.75 per MWh [56]. Those values were then 
used to determine an expected value for the PPAterm fraction used in the production loss 
calculation. In Figure 7 the PPAterm = 1.1, which means that (from the point of view of 
the Seller) it was cheaper to sell into the spot-market then to sell to the Buyer under the 
PPA contract (i.e., “cheaper to sell” means more money for the Seller).9 The results 
from Figure 7 show that the LCOE remains almost flat or very slowly decreasing, as 
the Maxlim increases, followed by two sudden drops. When Maxlim increases in Figure 
7, there is more loss to the Seller because it is more profitable to sell on the spot-market. 
When Maxlim= 1, a majority of years are producing energy at or below the expected 
CF, and all of that energy in those years is bought by the Buyer, quickly dropping the 
LCOE. However, some energy is still purchased in the spot-market in the few years (or 
single year in these cases) when the capacity factor is higher than expected. When 
Maxlim reaches the same fraction as the variation around the CF,  there will be no change 
in the LCOE. This is seen in the cases where Maxlim  = 1 for a farm with no variation 
(“None”), Maxlim = 1.05 for a wind farm with 5% variation, and Maxlim = 1.2 for a wind 
farm with 20% variation. 
                                                 
9 This is not the always the case. Energy prices can vary from below $0 to $300 per MWh on the spot 





Figure 7: Offshore PPA with just a maximum energy delivery requirement with spot-
market sell option with different variations in energy around the average CF = 0.4, 
PPAterm = 1.1 
Results can be seen in Figure 8 for the case where all of the production is lost 
loss (PPAterm = 0) above the maximum energy delivery requirement. In this case, the 
PPA states that energy produced above the maximum limit cannot be sold. This figure 
shows that as the Maxlim is increased, which means the maximum energy delivery 
requirement is increasing, less energy is being produced outside of the limit. Higher 
variations in the CF are more effected by the Maxlim than those with less variation. 
Figure 7 is different from Figure 8 because Figure 8 does not have an outside sell 
option, and is therefore always experiencing a production loss at the value of the COE 





Figure 8: Offshore PPA with just a maximum energy delivery requirement with no 
outside energy sell option (defined by PPAterm = 0) with different variations in energy 
around the average CF = 0.4 
Both Figure 7 and Figure 8 appear to have a sudden drop in LCOE from a Maxlim 
of 0.95 to 1. This sudden decrease can be attributed to the number of years that have 
energy production above the Maxlim. According to the model used in this section 
(Figure 5), only one year is producing below the expected CF value. This means that 
for 4 years, and all 5 years for the wind farm which has no variation in CF, energy is 
being produced above the maximum annual energy delivery limit, and energy is always 
being produced at a loss in those years. Therefore, only when Maxlim = 1 are the 
majority of years are not producing above the limit. Even at Maxlim = 1, one year for 
every wind farm, except for the wind farm without variation, there is a higher than 
expected CF. Due to this one year, the LCOE for the wind farm without variation is 
lower than the LCOEs for the wind farms with variation at Maxlim = 1. 
There is another type of PPA that was not presented in this section, which is a 




conditions and requirements for both limits. The only difference is that the Maxlim can 
never be lower than the Minlim. Generally, in a PPA containing both limits, there is 
enough of a gap between the limits for energy to fall between them, but Minlim can 
never be larger than Maxlim or all energy produced will always be penalized.  The case 
of a PPA with both limits is considered in the wind farm cast study in the next section.  
2.2.1 Real Wind Farms Application 
This section explores the actual LCOEs produced for a set of real wind farms 
(real CF histories).  All the cases in this section use identical contract variables, 
requirements on energy delivery, and COE. The purpose of this wind farm case study 
is to evaluate the effects of using the same PPA on farms that vary in location and 
energy production. Four PPA options are considered. First a PPA with no energy 
delivery limits, where the energy is bought and sold as it is produced. The first type of 
PPA reflects a conventional LCOE where the PPA energy delivery limits are not 
applied. The second PPA has only a minimum delivery limit where energy is not 
allowed to be purchased or sold in the spot market after that limit has been reached. 
The third PPA has just a maximum delivery limit, and the fourth PPA has both delivery 
limits.  Real data was collected from 7 different wind farms (Table 1 [57]) that have 
different numbers of turbines, manufacturers, years built, rated power and country 
(Germany or Denmark). The data from Germany and Denmark was readily available 
from established wind farms with long enough history of data collection to be viable 
for consideration in the study.  All the costs used in the model verification tests were 




NREL’s highest expected COE in wind farms from 2025-2050 [58] is used in this case 
study.  





Location (Number of 
Turbines) 
1 - Vestas (2 MW) 2002 Germany (17) 
2 - Enercon (2 MW) 2005 Germany (24) 
3 - Siemens (2.3 MW) 2010 Denmark (11) 
4 - Enercon (2 MW) 2010 Germany (10) 
5 - Vestas (3 MW) 2010 Denmark (18) 
6 - Vestas (3 MW) 2007 Germany (5) 
7 - Siemens (3.6 MW) 2006 Germany (7) 
 
The four different PPA types assume Maxlim = 0.75 and a Minlim = 0.52.
10 Figure 
9 and Figure 10 portray two different wind farms actual CF compared to the Maxlim and 
Minlim used in the PPAs. The figures show that using the same annual energy delivery 
quantities on two different farms potentially produce different results due to the 
different actual annual CF variation. The wind farm in Figure 9 has more variation in 
CF than the wind farm in Figure 10, where the CF of the wind farm is nearly constant 
from year to year. The LCOE of each turbine was calculated from the sum of LCOE 
costs at the end of 5 years. Figure 11 shows the LCOEs based on the different annual 
energy delivery requirements and the selection of applied penalties. 
 
                                                 
10 The values of Maxlim = 0.75 and Minlim = 0.52 are based on limits previously used in Zhu [76] and 






Figure 9: Wind Farm 3 actual CF to Maxlim = 0.75 and Minlim = 0.52 for a Pexp = 0.4 
 
 
Figure 10: Wind Farm 5 actual CF to Maxlim = 0.75 and Minlim = 0.52 for a Pexp = 
0.4 
The results in Figure 11 show that in most of the wind farms, while using the 
same Maxlim and/or Minlim parameters, just having a maximum penalty resulted in 




with both penalties or those with just minimum penalties resulted in higher LCOEs. 
Based on the results from the model verification tests, for wind farms with the same 
turbine types and year manufactured, it can be assumed that the different clusters of 
LCOEs are caused by the differences in CF. Lower CFs cause larger differences 
between a PPA with just a maximum penalty and a PPA with just a minimum penalty 
as produced by wind farm datasets 1 and 2. While datasets 4 and 7 have tighter clusters 
of LCOE due to less variation in CFs. Wind farm data set 3 has a higher LCOE for 
PPAs with a maximum energy delivery limit that is caused by annual CFs that do not 
frequently fall below the threshold for the minimum annual energy delivery limit, but 
more frequently have production loss due to producing energy above the maximum 
annual energy delivery limit. There is significant value in setting appropriate limits in 
the PPAs for different farms due to the different wind characteristics and design of each 
project, which can create no difference in the conventional to the actual LCOE up to 
an actual LCOE that is approximately 1.5 times the conventional LCOE. 
 





 Table 2 shows the actual LCOEs for three of the wind farms from the dataset. 
Offenheim, Germany is wind farm 7, Galmsbüll-Marien-kogg, Germany is wind farm 
6, and Svoldrup by. Vognsild, Denmark is wind farm 3. Again, it is demonstrated that 
wind farm 7 would not lose from entering into a PPA with a minimum energy purchase 
limit or a PPA with a maximum energy purchase limit. On the other hand, wind farms 
3 and 6 need to be careful, and would have to request a different PPA price depending 
on which energy purchase limit the PPA has. 
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Max. Energy 
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3.1.1 Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
 Renewable Portfolio Standards are laws passed by States requiring that certain 
renewable energy consumption levels be met. At the moment, 29 States have an RPS 
and 7 States have a voluntary renewable energy standard or target [59]. Typically, a 
State RPS will break down renewable energy into Tier 1 and Tier 2 renewable sources. 
Tier 1 will include solar, onshore wind, biomass, methane, geothermal, ocean, fuel cell 
that produces electricity from a Tier 1 source, hydroelectric, poultry litter-to-energy, 
waste-to-ender, refuse-derived fuel, and thermal energy from a thermal biomass system 
[60]. Tier 2 includes hydroelectric power other than pump storage generation, but some 
Tier 1 RECs may be used to satisfy Tier 2 requirements [60]. Offshore wind does not 
fall under either of these tiers and is considered its own category. For the State of 





Figure 12: Annual RPS Requirements by Tier [60] 
3.1.2 Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) in the U.S. are a State developed solution 
for increasing the competitiveness of renewable energy in the market. These credits are 
important to PPAs as they decrease the LCOE by subsidizing part of the cost. There 
are two types of RECs, RECs that fully cover the cost of renewable energy at their 
LCOE value and RECs that partially cover the cost of renewable energy. This thesis 
focuses on RECs that fully cover the LCOE value of energy, specifically the Maryland 
Offshore Renewable Energy Credits (ORECs). The Maryland ORECs function like a 
PPA as they set a price schedule and the maximum amount of offshore wind energy 




3.1.3 Maryland Offshore Renewable Energy Credits (ORECs) 
In 2013, the governor of Maryland, Martin O’Malley, in conjunction with the 
Maryland Energy Administration (MEA), wrote and passed a bill that developed a 
secure financial mechanism to meet the offshore wind carve-out mandated in the 
State’s Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). The Bill was based on a similar law 
passed in New Jersey.  According to the bill, Maryland utilities are required to meet 
2.5% of all energy sales from offshore wind [61]. This mandate can be tracked by the 
number of ORECs utilities have in which they can claim they have purchased 1 MWh 
of offshore wind energy. ORECs are tax credits (TCs) that fully fund offshore wind 
farms to ensure that they are sold into the Maryland energy market while bundling in 
other partial TCs.  
The ORECs function like PPAs by limiting the amount of energy that can be 
purchased within the State, and they used a calculated LCOE to determine the levelized 
OREC price and price schedule. While the law requires utilities to reach the offshore 
wind carve-out, it also limits the amount of energy that can come from offshore wind 
into the State by that same carve-out. In this sense, the carve-out functions like a 
minimum and maximum energy limit, but the law only requires utilities to meet the 
carve-out and therefore the minimum energy purchase limit does not apply in the LCOE 
for the offshore wind farms. Instead, the offshore wind farms only need to consider the 
cost that arises from the maximum amount of energy they can sell into the State. In 
addition to limiting the amount of allowed offshore wind energy, the ORECs place 




not exceed a levelized value of $190/MWh in 2012 dollars and the applicants’ energy 
generation into the State cannot increase the average residential ratepayer’s monthly 
bill by more than $1.50/month in 2012 dollars [61].  
Table 3 - Offshore Wind Farm Specifications for US Wind and Skipjack 
 US Wind Skipjack 
Number of turbines 62 15 
Total capacity (MW) 248 120 
Cost to build ($ million) 1,375 720 
Expected start of operation 
date 
January 2020 November 2022 
Number of requested and 
awarded ORECs per year 
913,845 455,482 
LCOE ($/MWh) 137.06 131.93 
Average Monthly Ratepayer 
Impact ($ per month) 
0.974 0.433 
 
In late 2016 and early 2017, the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC), 
which was assigned the task of reviewing the OREC applications and ensuring that they 
met the standards articulated in the House Bill, received two applications for ORECs 
from US Wind and Skipjack. US Wind is the current lease holder for the offshore lease 
off the coast of Maryland and Skipjack is the current leaseholder of the offshore lease 
off the coast of Delaware [62]. The lease area of Skipjack is shown in Figure 13, and 
the lease area for US Wind is shown in Figure 14. A third party, Levitan Associates 
Inc. (LAI), was hired as a consultant to perform financial modeling and calculate the 




Wind and Skipjack to calculate their LCOEs, and determined the final values shown in 
Table 3 [62]. Determining the LCOE and Gross OREC price during the application 
process for each wind farm was an iterative process as the proposed farms contested 
several of the cost variables used by LAI in the calculations and the LCOEs. LAI 
utilized a conventional LCOE model that did not include production loss, but does 
consider that each wind farm might have increased some of the expected costs to add 
some buffer against costs than expected. The LCOEs also include a level of profit, 
which is only known by each applicant. U.S. Wind was finally determined to have an 
LCOE of $137.06/MWh and Skipjack was determined to have an LCOE of 
$131.93/MWh [63]. Both offshore applicants requested a number of ORECs based on 










Figure 14: US Wind offshore wind farm lease area [64] 
After the LCOEs and quantity of ORECs were agreed upon by the applicants, 
the PSC was then given the task of determining which wind farm would receive the 
ORECs. In May 2017, the PSC decided to award both applicants their requested 
ORECs at a levelized 2012-dollar price of $131.93/MWh. The decision to award both 
applicants ORECs was a political decision based on the assumption that together, the 
offshore wind farms will be under the requirements outlined in the House Bill. One of 
those requirements was that offshore wind could not exceed 2.5% of all energy sales. 




added up and the PSC noted that the sum of awarded OREC to both applicants fell 
below the offshore wind carve-out stated in the law as seen in Table 4 [12].  
LAI was also tasked with calculating the average residential ratepayer impact. 
The expected average monthly ratepayer impact was calculated at $0.975/month for 
U.S. Wind and $0.433/month for Skipjack [62]. The Maryland PSC summed up the 
two impacts ($1.408 per month) and determined that both wind farms could be awarded 
ORECs because $1.408 per month is less than the OREC limited ratepayer impact of 
$1.50 per month. Finally, the OREC price of $131.93/MWh was awarded to both 
offshore wind farms at the LCOE of Skipjack, disregarding the higher LCOE of U.S. 
Wind [62].  
The PSC did not account for various conditions such as a combined OREC price 
that addresses the separate financing of the two wind farms and the PSC did not account 
the ratepayer effect of having both wind farms utilizing the ORECs and offloading their 
energy onto the grid during the same period. The PSC assumed that the effect of both 
wind farms was a simple summation of the two. This is not how ratepayer impact is 
calculated and a method to calculating the ratepayer impact is shown in Section 3.2.2 
where it is notable from the model that a simple summation of the expected impacts is 
not correct. The ratepayer impact also needs to consider that more energy is in the grid 
than what was calculated initially. The calculation for both also considers the ratepayer 





Table 4 - Percentage of Energy Sales in Maryland Met from Current Awarded ORECs 
for Skipjack and US Wind [12] 
Year Offshore Wind 





























3.2 LAI’s Analysis 
 Before applying the modified LCOE calculation formed in this thesis, it is 
necessary to reproduce (reverse engineer) the analysis performed for the PSC by LAI.  
Most of the inputs to reproduce the OREC price for each offshore wind farm are 
provided in the various LAI and Maryland PSC reports.  Additional inputs necessary 
for the analysis (obtained from LAI and other sources) are provided herein. 
3.2.1 OREC Price Calculation 
 The LAI reports provided most of the information necessary to reproduce the 
LCOE calculation [12] [65] [66]. These reports provide the expected energy generation 
and CAPEX value from the cost to build as were given in Table 3 [62]. In another 
report, the assumed discount rate was also provided by LAI at 0.03/year [65]. The 
calculated LCOEs of $131.93 per MWh for Skipjack and $137.06 per MWh for US 
Wind were provided. However, the OPEX values were missing from the reports and 
had to be derived from the given information.  
A simple LCOE calculation (Equation (13)) was used to determine the cost 





𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  










Where OPEX is the cost for every unit of produced energy. In this calculation E is 
evaluated by MWh as the ORECs are awarded per MWh. Using the values provided 
by LAI and the following LCOE calculations were derived.  
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  












𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  











Equation (14) shows the LCOE calculation for US Wind where Ei is 913,845 MWh 
and Equation (15) shows the LCOE calculation for Skipjack where Ei is 455,482 MWh. 
Ei appears in this these equations for the case study as it depends on the assumed wind 
speed distribution and will affect the LCOE equation when PL is included. For now, 
Equation (14) and Equation (15) primarily show the fixed cost variables. A total list of 
the cost variables in the LCOE equation are provided in  Table 5. 
 Table 5 - LCOE cost variables for each offshore wind farm 
 US Wind Skipjack 
CAPEX ($/kW installed) 5,544.35 6,000 
OPEX ($/MWh) 61.83 52,89 
Ei (MWh) 913,845 455,482 
r 0.03 0.03 





After the OREC price was calculated, the price schedule for ORECs had to be 
calculated. The Maryland PSC provided a bid price form where the levelized OREC 
price was adjusted based on the annual deflator and real discount rate to determine the 
annual price and price schedule of the ORECs (see Table 6). While awarding of the 
ORECs was determined by the levelized OREC price, the annual bid price is important 
in calculating the Ratepayer Impact which is addressed in the next section. 




2021 0.856 0.937 
2022 0.840 0.931 
2023 0.825 0.924 
2024 0.810 0.917 
2025 0.795 0.911 
2026 0.780 0.904 
2027 0.766 0.898 
2028 0.752 0.891 
2029 0.738 0.885 
2030 0.724 0.879 
2031 0.711 0.872 
2032 0.698 0.866 
2033 0.685 0.860 
2034 0.672 0.854 




2036 0.648 0.842 
2037 0.636 0.836 
2038 0.624 0.830 
2039 0.613 0.824 
2040 0.602 0.818 
2041 0.590 0.812 
 
3.2.2 Ratepayer Impact Calculation 
Ratepayer impact was calculated using the LCOE calculation in Equations (8)-
(11) and the following analysis. First, a 20-year OREC bid price form was provided by 
the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) to set an escalating yearly price per 
MWh based on a levelized 2012-dollar value (see previous section). This calculation 
utilizes the LCOE and a built-in discount and inflation rate to determine the annual 
OREC price [67]. Once the annual price for ORECs (POP) has been calculated, the 
next step in finding the average monthly ratepayer impact (RRI) is to determine the net 
ratepayer cost (NRC) [65]. NRC is calculated as, 
 



























Where cy is the last year ORECs will be received, this is expected to be 20 years for 




expected end dates are provided in Table 5. POP is the price of ORECs for calendar 
year i according to the schedule provided by the Maryland PSC. EOA is the expected 
OREC amount obtained in the State for year i. NDRP is the nominal discount rate for 
OREC payments. MO is the proposed months of operations in calendar year i. INF is 
the inflation rate. MRC is the market revenue credits, ARC is the avoided REC cost, 
MPE is the market price effect, and NDRB is the nominal discount rate for OREC 
benefits.  
The NRC is divided by the number of years that the ORECs are awarded to 
account for the average annual NRC. In the case study, each wind farm is expected to 
run 20 years individually and 21 for the combined wind farms because they are 
expected to have different operational start dates. The residential ratepayer impact 






where AALE is the annual applicable load, also known as the annual load of energy 
entering the Maryland grid. It should be noted that from these equations that AALE was 
derived from the number of awarded ORECs and the offshore wind carve-out 
percentage provided by LAI in Table 4. There were most terms used by LAI to convert 
the RRI from an annual impact to a monthly impact which in the end through the 
division and multiplication of the terms equaled 1 [65]. The variables used by LAI for 





Table 7 - Ratepayer Impact Calculation Variable Values 
Terms US Wind Skipjack 
NDRP (per year)11 0.03 0.03 
NDRB (per year) 0.033 0.033 
INFL (per year) 0.02 0.02 
MO (months/year) 12 12 
MRC ($) 45.89EOAi 47.91EOAi 
ARC ($) 12.40EOAi 11.86EOAi 
MPE ($) 1.57EOAi 1.97EOAi 
 
3.3 New LCOE Model Application 
3.3.1 Model Application to 3 Different Cases 
PPAs are designed to guarantee the purchase and sale of energy between two 
parties, whereas ORECs are designed to incentivize the purchase and sale of offshore 
wind energy between utilities in the State and offshore wind farms. Both PPAs and the 
Maryland ORECs calculate LCOE to negotiate an agreed upon purchase price for each 
unit of energy. Like PPAs, the ORECs utilize an energy purchase limitation, 
                                                 
11 This value represents the nominal rate of return on a 30-year Treasury Bond. LAI used this rate while 
calculating the OREC price and RRI, although LAI recognizes that this is not a normal discount rate for 




specifically there is a clause in the law that limits the amount of energy that can be sold 
and purchased in the State of Maryland. 
For the Maryland ORECs, only the PL is used because there is no penalty on 
the wind farms when they produce under the expected energy output. During the 
awarding of the ORECs, no PL was included in the LCOE because energy generation 
was assumed to be constant (the average energy generation) and the combined quantity 
of ORECs were assumed to never go above the 2.5% offshore wind carve-out [12]12. 
The ratepayer impact was also assumed to be only affected by the OREC price after 
the TCs and price effects were removed. LAI used load forecasting to determine the 
annual applicable load (see Equation (14)). During the awarding of the ORECs the 
combined effect of the two offshore wind farms was not considered. It was assumed 
that the residential ratepayer impact could just be summed up, which is not the case 
because each ratepayer impact only considered the separate load and effect of energy 
from one offshore wind farm entering the grid at a time. Additionally, the lower LCOE 
of the two wind farms was chosen to be the OREC price. 
In this case study, an hourly analysis (8760 hours per year) was used to generate 
energy production based on the wind speed distributions and the planned turbine 
models for each wind farm. In this analysis, the wind speed distributions were gathered 
by NOAA from onshore data both of the offshore wind lease areas. The locations of 
the wind speed data stations are shown in Figure 15, and are circled in red and scaled 
to hub height [68] [69]. Wind speed was sampled from a Weibull distribution, and was 
                                                 
12 The offshore wind developers may have accounted for some uncertainties in potential CAPEX and 
OPEX costs to the wind farms, but they did not account for the loss from continuing to produce energy 




scaled to hub height for each turbine type where the shape parameter was 2.57 m/s and 
scale of 7.94 m/s for US Wind and the shape for Skipjack was 2.57 m/s and the scale 
was 8.28 m/s. The actual sampled wind speed distribution for Skipjack is shown in 
Figure 16 [69] and the wind speed distribution for US Wind is shown in Figure 17 [68]. 
Power curves for Skipjack (Figure 18) and US Wind (Figure 19) were then used with 
the wind speeds to calculate the energy generated. 
 
 





Figure 16 - Wind speed distribution for Skipjack site [69] 
 
 





Figure 18: SWT-8.0-154 turbine to be built be Skipjack [71] 
 
 
Figure 19: SWT-4.0-130 to be built by US Wind [72] 
Maryland’s grid is part of a larger network known as the Pennsylvania-Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) network. This means that the offshore wind energy may enter the grid 
in Maryland, but it may not necessarily be consumed within the State. This creates part 
of the complexity in modeling offshore wind consumption in the state after offshore 
wind energy has been produced up to the awarded OREC quantity, but still falls below 
the offshore wind carve-out. Due to a lack of clarity associated with how the energy 
generated can or cannot be sold during the years that the offshore wind farms are 




to analyze the actual LCOE for the wind farms. Figure 20 provides a graphical 
description of the three cases considered in this thesis, and Figure 21 shows how 
Equation (9) is modified to account for each case. 
 
 






Figure 21: PL modified for ORECs 
In Case 1, the quantity of awarded ORECs to each offshore wind farm is the 
absolute maximum energy purchase limit. Above this limit, energy has no value (i.e., 
excess energy production has to be “dumped”). Maxlim in this case is 1, and Pexp is the 
number of awarded ORECs for each farm. PPAterm in this case is 0. 
In Case 2, it is assumed that more ORECs can be awarded to both wind farms. 
The maximum energy purchase limit is the offshore wind carve-out of 2.5% of all 
energy sales in the State and above that carve-out the offshore wind energy would be 
“dumped”. This also assumes that each wind farm would be receiving ORECs for the 
maximum expected energy production so that all potential energy production can be 
financed through the ORECs. Maxlim in this case is 1, and Pexp varies annually to 
Changing variable based on limit 
imposed by RPS Law. Either: 
• 2.5% of total energy 
consumption 
• Awarded OREC quantity 
because Max
lim
 = 1 
Remains 0 for case 1 
and 2, but is changed to 
reflect selling into the 
spot market for case 3. 
The spot market prices 
were randomly sampled 
from a hand collected 
data set for random 
hours throughout the 
day from 3/12/17- 
6/5/18 




represent energy sales in the State of Maryland as calculated by LAI. PPAterm in this 
case is 0. 
Case 3 assumes that no additional ORECs can be awarded to the two future 
offshore wind farms. The quantity is fixed, but excess energy generation can be sold 
into the market at spot-market prices where the spot-market price was determined using 
a distribution of sampled prices (see Figure 22). The energy price is no longer 
guaranteed and energy could be purchased above or below the LCOE. This case 
assumes that TCs are still available for the excess energy. Energy sold into the market 
is still regulated by the offshore wind carve-out, which functions as the maximum 
energy purchase limit. Maxlim in this case is 1 and because this case looks at the value 
of offshore wind energy sold beyond the ORECs amount, Pexp is the same as case 2. 
However, in this case the PPAterm is calculated for every MWh of energy between the 
awarded ORECs quantity and the Pexp by randomly sampling a spot-market price per 
MWh from a sample of hourly MWh prices collected between 3/12/18 and 6/5/18 and 
then calculating the fraction by dividing the COE by the spot-market price, the sampled 





Figure 22: Spot-Market Prices Sampled from 3/12/18 - 6/5/18 
Table 8 contains the values used for triangle distributions assumed for each cost 
variable in the sensitivity analysis [73]. It is suggested by NREL in their report that 
these distributions are triangular as they represent the highs, the lows, and the average 
of the industry [73]. The report also suggests that LCOE is more sensitive to CAPEX 
and CF than operating life and discount rate. These values were collected from fixed 
offshore wind farms in Europe, there is not enough data in the U.S. on offshore wind 
farms, and the most reliable values at this time come from European data.  
Table 8 - Distributions for Variables Used in Sensitivity Analysis (triangular 
distributions assumed) 





2,000 4,579 7,500 
OPEX ($/MWh) 79 158 237 






 In all of the results to follow, the distributions of each variables’ sensitivity for 
US Wind, Skipjack, and the combined wind farm price are presented in the same figure. 
Figure 23 contains a legend for the results on the sensitivity analysis that are uniform 
across all cases and wind farms. The distributions in blue are the sensitivities for LCOE 
to the discount rate. The distributions in pink are the sensitivities for LCOE to CAPEX. 
The distributions in green are the sensitivities for LCOE to OPEX. The distributions in 
purple are the fixed cost variable results where only Ei is sampled based on the wind 
speed distributions. Finally, the distributions in yellow are the sensitivities to all the 
variables on LCOE. 
 Each case also has a table with the average LCOE and variance in LCOE that 
results from the sensitivities. The results are compared in each table to LAI’s calculated 
LCOEs to demonstrate the differences under the assumption that the fixed cost 





Figure 23: Legend for LCOE Sensitivity Analysis 
3.4.1 Case 1 
 Table 9 provides the results from the fixed cost variable LCOE analysis where 
only PL is varied with energy production. The LCOEs presented are the average LCOE 
in the analysis and the variance of those results.  Compared to the calculated OREC 
price for each wind farm, the Case 1 results using the fixed cost variable provided from 




farm price are higher what was awarded. In Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26 the 
distributions corresponding to the discount rate and the fixed variables analysis are not 
included because there is very little variance for both (see Table 9). This demonstrates 
that while the maximum energy purchase limit is the number of awarded ORECs, there 
is more certainty that expected LCOE is correct given that the CAPEX and OPEX 
values are correct. Figure 23, Figure 24, and Figure 25. 
 
Figure 24: Sensitivities on cost variables for US Wind LCOE for Case 1 
  
 






Figure 26: Sensitivities on cost variables for combined wind farm LCOE for Case 1 
 Table 9 provides a closer look at the variance and average values of all the 
sensitivity results. For all three wind farms, the lowest average LCOE occurs when all 
cost variables are varied. However, with the sensitivity on all cost variables there is 
also the highest level of variance across all results. The distributions allow for lower 
costs to be sampled compared to the fixed costs assumptions that LAI made, which 
produces the lower average LCOE results, but the distributions also allow for more 
variations, which produce the highest variance results. This same assumption can be 
derived as the highest average LCOE results arise from the sensitivity analysis using 
fixed costs and these results also produce the least variance. The results also show that 
the sensitivities on OPEX produce the highest variance of all cost variables, which 
implies that OPEX can have the greatest impact on the level of accuracy while 












LAI Calculated OREC Price 137.06 131.93 N/A 
Average LCOE with fixed costs 157.37 146.83 152.65 
Variance in LCOE with fixed 
costs 
0.01 0.05 0.01 
Average LCOE with variation in 
CAPEX  
150.75 135.30 144.05 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in CAPEX 
17.94  21.61 11.72 
Average LCOE with variation in 
OPEX 
 144.96 143.82 142.97 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in OPEX 
 104.30 98.56 60.99 
Average LCOE with variation in 
discount rate 
157.36 146.86 152.88 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in discount rate 
0.01 0.06 0.14 
Average LCOE with variation in 
all variables 
138.33 132.47 134.25 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in all variables 
120.27 117.64 78.58 
 
 Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26 show that there is little effect on the LCOE 
from discount rates. However, the means of the distributions are higher for each wind 
farm and the combined case compared to the distributions from the sensitivities on the 
other cost variables. This suggest that using a discount rate of 0.03 has reduced the 
overall LCOE of the wind farms and allowed for a lower OREC price to be awarded, 
but there is little effect on the LCOE as the discount rate varies in real time.  
3.4.2 Case 2 
  Figure 28 demonstrates the same principal that there is little difference between 




controled sensitivity on the fixed costs. However, Figure 27 and Figure 29 show that 
there is a difference in the average LCOE between the fixed costs results and the results 
from the sensitivity analysis on the discount rate. Table 10 shows that the average 
LCOE for sensitvity on discount rate for US Wind is lower than the average LCOE is 
using fixed cost variables. In comparison, the average LCOE with sensivity on discount 
rate is higher for the combined wind farm than the average LCOE using fixed costs. 
This can imply that uncertainty in the discount rate for both wind farms that are 
generating more energy than expected into the market can result in a higher LCOE. 
Although we know from the results in Case 1 that PL has the largest impact on making 
LCOE higher than calculated, the results in Figure 29 imply that a higher than expected 
discount rate can also have a sever impact on the LCOE for Case 2 because the only 
time PL is incurred in this analysis is during the combined wind farm consideration and 
the impact is minimal because the maximum energy purchase limit is much higher than 
Case 1. If the discount rate is higher than expected, than the impact of the TLCC is 
higher for each unit of produced energy.  
 






Figure 28: Sensitivities on cost variables for Skipjack LCOE for Case 2 
 
 
Figure 29: Sensitivities on cost variables for combined wind farm LCOE for Case 2 
 Table 10 provides all the averages and variance in LCOEs from the sensitivity 
analysis.  The results are similar to Case 1 (see Table 9) as the higher average LCOEs 
from the results are in the fixed costs, which also have the lowest variance, and the 
highest variance in the results with almost all the lowest average LCOEs are in the 
sensitivity on all cost variables. From each individual cost variable sensitivity, OPEX 
shows to have the highest variance implying the importance on accurate predictions on 











LAI Calculated OREC Price 137.06 131.93 N/A 
Average LCOE with fixed costs 110.12 129.49 117.35 
Variance in LCOE with fixed 
costs 
0.02 0.06 0.12 
Average LCOE with variation in 
CAPEX  
103.37 113.62 108.84 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in CAPEX 
17.67 35.92 11.40 
Average LCOE with variation in 
OPEX 
75.06 126.54 107.69 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in OPEX 
100.16 99.19 63.89 
Average LCOE with variation in 
discount rate 
87.12 129.49 127.07 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in discount rate 
0.01 0.06 1.77 
Average LCOE with variation in 
all variables 
 91.36 110.59 108.64 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in all variables 
 126.21 140.37 79.86 
Case 2 results using fixed cost variables from LAI demonstrate that the LCOE 
could be lower if more offshore wind energy was being purchased. This is because the 
more energy being produced and sold by the system, the more costs that can be 
distributed across the system’s output.  In Case 2, the only time PL is incurred is during 
the combined wind farm LCOEs, but the results are still lower than the current awarded 
price of ORECs and the offshore wind carve-out can actually be achieved. 
3.4.3 Case 3 
Table 11 provides all the averages and variance in LCOEs from the sensitivity 
analysis.  The variance and average LCOE results for discount rate, fixed costs, all cost 




average LCOE in Case 3 is from the combined wind farm that has variation in all cost 
variables at $162.83/MWh and the highest variance at 173.08. Not only is it notably 
the highest average LCOE and variance in Case 3, it has the highest average LCOE and 
variance amongst all three cases. The combined wind farm also contains produces a 
high variance during the sensitivity on discount rate, which is likely causing the high 
variance and high average LCOE in the results for the sensitivity analysis on all cost 
variables. It is possible that the higher variance and average LCOE in the results on 
variation discount rate and variation on all cost variables due to the spot-market price 
effect having more impact on both wind farms as the two are selling more energy 
combined into the spot-market compared to the individual results. The discount rate 
would reflect the how much more uncertainty in the spot-market could impact the 
LCOE of wind farms as they choose to distribute more energy in it compared to 
distributing energy towards a Buyer at an established cost. At the same time, the results 
do show that if the wind farms are working separately and entering the spot-market 
where a majority of the generation has already been purchased through a PPA or REC, 
there is significantly less risk. 







LAI Calculated OREC Price 137.06 131.93 N/A 
Average LCOE with fixed costs 110.11 109.53 133.75 
Variance in LCOE with fixed 
costs 
0.02 0.12 3.10 
Average LCOE with variation in 
CAPEX  
103.47 98.15 126.96 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in CAPEX 
17.80 20.69 20.40 
Average LCOE with variation in 
OPEX 




Variance in LCOE with 
variation in OPEX 
100.50 101.19 105.57 
Average LCOE with variation in 
discount rate 
110.11 109.53 181.19 
Variance in LCOE with 
variation in discount rate 
0.02 0.16 51.36 
Average LCOE with variation in 
all variables 
91.23 95.49 162.83 
Variance in with variation in all 
variables 
110.25 119.37 173.08 
 It is possible that the LCOEs from Case 3 are lower than the OREC price 
because the Seller receives the benefit of the TCs for energy sold into the spot market. 
As seen in Equation (10), TCs reduce the LCOE of a project if the project directly 
receives them. In the case of ORECs, they are bundled with other partial RECs and 
therefore the utility indirectly receives the benefit of the partial RECs. The spot market 
sample distribution from Figure 22 indicates that there would be a loss. since energy in 
the spot-market is more frequently sold at a lower price than the COE ($131.93/MWh).    
 
 






Figure 31: Sensitivities for cost variables for Skipjack LCOE for Case 3 
  
 
Figure 32: Sensitivities for cost variables for combined wind farm LCOE for Case 3 
 Table 12 provides a comparison of all the average LCOEs for the fixed cost 
variables for each case and wind farm to the calculated LCOEs by LAI. The fixed cost 
variables results were provided for the final comparison under the assumption that the 
predictions were correct and the awarding of more ORECs or a change in OREC price 
would be dependent solely on an LCOE that included the PL and not the probabilities 




Table 12 - Summary of all cases for OREC Price using LAI cost variables with modified 
LCOE 
 





LAI’s calculation $137.06 $131.93 N/A 
Case 1 
calculation 
$157.36 $146.83 $152.66 
Case 2 
calculation 
$110.12 $129.49 $117.35 
Case 3 
calculation 
$110.11 $109.53 $133.75 
 Based on the results shown in Table 12, the ideal case for both wind farms 
receiving ORECs is Case 2 where each would receive the maximum amount possible 
as long as it is under the 2.5% offshore wind carve-out. This results in a lower price of 
$117.35/MWh compared to the $131.93/MWh that was awarded and the offshore wind 
carve-out would be achieved compared to the current situation. The other ideal case for 
each offshore wind developer is to sell their excess energy into the spot-market (Case 
3). This is a higher risk, but it can be sold at a lower value than the OREC price and it 
is better than not selling excess energy. The combined wind LCOE in Case 3 is not 
probable as both wind farms would have to work together, but they are competitors 




3.4.4 Ratepayer Impact 
 Table 13 provides the monthly residential ratepayer impact from the average 
LCOEs for each wind farm for each case given under fixed costs provided by LAI. The 
results show that under the current situation, if the wind farms are limited to sell their 
energy at their awarded OREC quantity at the price of $131/93/MWh, the monthly 
residential ratepayer impact is lower than expected at $1.267/month. However, if the 
OREC quantity were to remain the same, but the LCOEs were adjusted to account for 
the production loss incurred from the maximum energy purchase limit, then the 
monthly residential ratepayer impact of both farms selling their energy into Maryland 
would be higher than the $1.50/month limit at $1.633/month.  
Table 13 – Residential Ratepayer Impact Results ($/month) 
Impacts US Wind  Skipjack Combined 
LAI’s calculation $0.974 $0.433 $1.407 (PSC) 
Current Situation $0.974 $0.433 $1.267 
Case 1 $1.158 $0.578 $1.633 
Case 2 $0.767 $0.526 $1.209 
Case 3 $0.842 $0.849 $1.057 
 
 Case 3’s combined results reflect the residential ratepayer impact for the energy 
sold in the spot market. It does not consider the impact from the ORECs in addition to 




the awarded ORECs, offshore wind energy entering the spot-market will likely have a 
higher overall ratepayer impact than that demonstrated in Table 13. Additionally, the 
combined wind farm in Case 3 is not likely as both wind farms would have to be 
working together beyond the ORECs when they will be competitors in the market at 
that point. 
 The ideal situation out of the 3 cases is Case 2 combined. The average monthly 
ratepayer impact would be lower than the current situation although more offshore 
wind energy would be entering the grid. Not only would Maryland be closer to meeting 
the 2.5% offshore wind carve-out set by the State’s RPS, they could do so at a lower 
cost to consumers. This is likely do to the lower LCOE of $117.35/MWh that could be 
awarded to both offshore developers compared to $131.93/MWh as currently awarded.  
3.5 Conclusions 
 For the current state of the ORECs the average monthly ratepayer impact still 
falls below the $1.50/month limit set by Maryland law. However, the price of the 
ORECs is not consistent with the actual LCOEs. The actual LCOEs are higher than 
expected as seen in the results from Case 1, and if the ORECs were awarded at the 
current quantity at the actual LCOE for both wind farms, the average monthly ratepayer 
impact would be $1.633 per month, which is above the $1.50 per month limit set by 
the law. Case 2 demonstrates that not only can more ORECs be awarded at a lower 
price, the expected ratepayer impact is still lower than that “calculated” by LAI for the 
PSC. This does not mean that more ORECs can be awarded at the current offshore wind 




farms produce energy over the offshore wind carve-out and incurred a cost from the 
production loss. However, the results do suggest that if the offshore wind carve-out was 
increased more ORECs could be awarded at a lower than expected price. This may 
allow for US Wind to build more turbines in the second half of their lease area13. 
 All of the results from sensitivity on discount rate, excluding the results in 
Figure 32, indicate that LCOE is least sensitive to discount rate. This is surprising as 
many people focus on choosing an appropriate discount rates when calculating LCOE 
[31]. The results also indicate that LCOE is most sensitive to OPEX although the 
resulting average LCOE is typically lower than the LCOE using fixed costs. This is 
likely due to the distribution of OPEX values that can fall lower than those expected 
for each wind farm. High variance in OPEX results also suggest that it is critical to 
calculate with as much accuracy as possible an expected OPEX value or the LCOE may 
be much higher or lower than expected. 
Choosing which maximum energy purchase limit to use for the ORECs can 
significantly change the actual LCOE of the wind farm. At a limit that is too low (i.e., 
the current awarded OREC quantity), the LCOE can be higher than the OREC price 
and LCOE determined by LAI. At a limit that is higher (i.e., 2.5% of all energy sales 
in the State), the wind farms can still incur a penalty from overproduction of energy 
when both are selling the maximum amount of energy into the State, but the actual 
LCOEs can be lower than the awarded OREC price. 
  
                                                 
13 Originally, US Wind submitted their application to build 750 MW with the ORECs only covering 248 
MW. US Wind stated in the application that with 248 MW they will safely be covered under the ORECs 





Chapter 4: Conclusions, Contributions, and Future Work 
4.1 Summary 
 PPA and REC energy purchase limits can increase the actual LCOE of wind 
farms as the penalty from overproduction and underproduction of energy is applied. 
This can create significant losses to the wind farm as the actual LCOE could be higher 
from the conventionally calculated LCOE by a factor of 1.5. In the case of the Maryland 
ORECs, the actual LCOE given the maximum energy purchase limit at the number of 
awarded OREC quantity are higher by a factor of 1.16 from the awarded OREC price. 
This can cost the wind farm millions in lost revenue. 
 The threshold of the energy purchase limit can also significantly affect the 
LCOE. The penalty may be more significant depending on where the threshold is 
compared to what energy may actually be produced by the system. A maximum energy 
purchase limit that is close to the maximum expected amount of energy that will be 
generated could lower the LCOE compared to the conventionally calculated LCOE that 
assumes average energy generation. This is demonstrated in the ORECs as Case 2 how 
a lower LCOE by a factor of 0.89 from the awarded OREC price. 
4.2 Scientific and Technical Contributions 




1. The first LCOE model that includes PPA penalties was developed. 
2. It was demonstrated that there are significant discrepancies created by 
asymmetric cash flows and penalties when using the LCOE model as an infinite 
horizon model when energy production is uncertain. 
3. It was demonstrated that the Maryland ORECs have been awarded at a lower 
price than the LCOE considering the penalty from only selling the average 
expected energy generation. 
4. It was determined that the State of Maryland could award additional ORECs at 
a lower price while still producing energy under the offshore wind carve-out. 
4.3 Future Work 
 Another case has been suggested to the Maryland PSC, where the offshore 
renewable energy credits could roll over and under each year. This is a more 
complicated case, since one would have to account for the value of energy that was 
sold or not sold the year before as it is sold into the next year. The LCOE model 
becomes a significantly more complex as the time value of energy is considered in the 
analysis, but it is uncertain if that energy is actually sold in the next year as the cash 
flows and value of energy in year i becomes dependent on year i+1. 
 This work could also be extended towards increasing the offshore wind carve-
out and allowing for a third party to be awarded ORECs. The issue then is, can the 
ORECs be awarded at a different price? US Wind could ask for more ORECs for the 




the LCOE where half the wind farm is already receiving ORECs. It is unknown if US 
Wind would have to consider the “other half” that is receiving ORECs as if it is a third 
party or if the State would not care as long as offshore wind energy is entering the State 
below the offshore wind carve-out. 
 Wind blows more during certain periods of the year compared to others, and 
PPAs and RECs currently adjust their accounts at the end of the year. This means that 
one party may be paying back the other for energy that should have been purchased or 
energy that was not supposed to be purchased. This brings into question of when is the 
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